When we talk about the command and control organizational structure, it doesn’t necessarily equate to authoritarian leadership, though it's often perceived that way. In practice, there’s a vital middle ground. In the high-stakes realm of physical security, particularly in close protection and risk assessments, the command and control model plays a critical role. It ensures rapid, coordinated decision-making during crises by establishing clear roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority.

However, if not managed carefully, this structure can become rigid, eventually giving rise to deeper organizational issues. When command and control slips into a fear-based hierarchy, it stifles initiative and suppresses valuable feedback. This creates a culture where personnel report what they think leadership wants to hear, rather than what leadership needs to hear.

This dynamic—often referred to as “reporting to please”—emerges when individuals, out of fear of repercussions or a desire to gain favor, tailor information to avoid conflict or secure approval. In doing so, they undermine situational awareness and potentially compromise overall safety. It also leads to a breakdown in communication, resulting in misaligned actions and delayed responses—an especially dangerous outcome in time-sensitive or high-risk situations.

Reporting to Please Real-World Scenarios

Operation Barbarossa

In 1965, long after World War II ended, Filipp Golikov, former head of Soviet military intelligence, confessed to a writer: “I distorted intelligence to please Stalin because I feared him.” It was a chilling admission, but not surprising.

Reporting is meant to help leaders make informed decisions, but only when it’s evidence-based and free from the pressure to pander to leadership’s vision. In Stalin’s Soviet Union, that principle was fatally compromised.

Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941—was the largest and costliest military offensive in history, involving millions of troops and opening the Eastern Front. It marked a major turning point in World War II and drew the Soviet Union fully into the Allied camp.

Before the invasion, Stalin was overwhelmed by a flood of conflicting intelligence. Repeated false alarms had desensitized him, leading to the dismissal of genuine warnings, a classic “crying wolf” scenario. German disinformation further muddied the waters, while valuable intelligence was often lost within the Soviet bureaucratic system.

But a deeper problem was the climate of fear Stalin created. Intelligence officers risked punishment for delivering unwelcome truths, which encouraged reports that aligned with Stalin’s expectations rather than reality. When Pavel Fitin, a foreign intelligence chief at the NKVD, passed his agents’ reports on German plans for Barbarossa right up until the invasion, he was disgraced. Ivan Proskurov, head of military intelligence in 1940, also reported what he believed to be the truth—regardless of what Stalin wanted to hear. For his honesty, he was shot in October 1941. His successor, Golikov, learned from his predecessor’s fatal mistake and ensured that his intelligence reporting conformed to Stalin’s preconceptions. As a result, he enjoyed a successful career under Stalin.

Kennedy & Vietnam

On October 22, 1963, US President John F. Kennedy invited the publisher of The New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, to the White House. During the meeting, Kennedy suggested that the Times consider transferring its correspondent in South Vietnam, David Halberstam, to another assignment. This suggestion was prompted by Halberstam's reporting, which indicated that the South Vietnamese government was losing to the Viet Cong—a narrative that contradicted the assessments Kennedy received from official channels. These were sources he seemed to prefer, as they told him what he likely wanted to hear: that Saigon, Washington’s ally, was winning the war.

Though Halberstam lacked access to top-level classified intelligence, his grassroots sources within the U.S. counterinsurgency community privately shared deep concerns about the war’s progress. These doubts were known within the American military and U.S. embassy in Saigon but were often downplayed or overlooked in official assessments.

As a result, reports passed to Washington presented a distorted view, which was accepted uncritically by a political establishment eager to believe the South Vietnamese government was holding its own against the Viet Cong.

Embracing an Effective Command and Control Culture

A healthy command and control culture balances structure with openness, empowering personnel to speak candidly and act decisively without fear. It should enable fast, honest decision-making rather than enforce control.

Key elements include:

  • Empowerment: Encouraging real-time, informed decisions.
  • Open Communication: Allowing concerns and feedback without fear.
  • Continuous Training: Keeping skills sharp against evolving threats.
  • Feedback Loops: Learning from each operation to improve.

Control without trust weakens security. True command lies in creating an environment where people are trusted to speak up and act decisively.